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COMMENT
THE FEDERAL POWER ACT’S DOUBLE
STANDARD: UNWINDING THE MOBILESIERRA DOCTRINE AFTER MORGAN
STANLEY CAPITAL GROUP, INC. V. PUBLIC
UTILITY DISTRICT NO. 1
*

JOHN M. WHITE

Emerging from two Supreme Court opinions decided in the 1950s, the MobileSierra doctrine has evolved to stand for a principle of contract sanctity in public
utility rate setting. The courts have largely come to the conclusion that the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (the Commission) has less authority to modify rates set
by contract, as compared to unilaterally-filed tariff rates, when the contract is the result
of arm’s-length negotiations between sophisticated parties of equal bargaining power,
unless the contract indicates otherwise. Only in “extraordinary circumstances,” the
Court has found, may the Commission step in to modify any such “Mobile-Sierra
contract.”
This Comment argues that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine, as interpreted recently in
Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility District No. 1, departs
from both the statutory intent of the Federal Power Act and the original cases from
which the doctrine derived its name. The Federal Power Act does not contemplate
imposing any extraordinary barriers to Commission modification of contract rates.
Similarly, the two cases from which the doctrine derived its name, United Gas Pipe
Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp. and Federal Power Commission v.
Sierra Pacific Power Co., sought to protect the public interest by restraining a
* Junior Staff Member, American University Law Review, Volume 61; J.D.
Candidate, May 2013, American University, Washington College of Law; B.S., Economics,
2006, Pennsylvania State University. Thank you to Meredith Goldich, my Note and
Comment editor, and the Law Review staff for your significant effort in preparing this
piece for publication. I would also like to give a special thanks to my friends and
family, especially my parents, for your endless support.
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utility’s ability to unilaterally raise prices set in a contract, but they did not seek to
limit the Commission’s authority to modify contracts generally. By further limiting the
Commission’s authority to modify contracts, Morgan Stanley has encroached on the
Commission’s ability to fulfill its statutory obligation to protect the public interest.
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INTRODUCTION
“[I]t doesn’t matter what you crazy people in California do, because I got
1
smart guys out there who can always figure out how to make money.”
-Kenneth Lay, former CEO of Enron Corporation, speaking to
David Freeman, then-Chairman of the California Power Authority
On several occasions during 2000 and 2001, the lights went out in
California, affecting businesses and everyday life and raising public
2
ire. In Irvine, for example, computer-operated traffic lights went out
in May 2001, turning freeways into parking lots and bringing much of
1. Peter H. King et al., Paper Trail Points to Roots of Energy Crisis, L.A. TIMES, June
16, 2002, at A1.
2. See John M. Broder, California Power Failures Linked to Energy Companies, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 18, 2002, at A22 (explaining that the first blackouts in California since
World War II caused thousands of businesses to close and interrupted power to
homes, hospitals, schools, and shopping malls).
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3

life there to a halt. A confluence of factors had caused rolling
4
5
blackouts in the region, as prices for power rose to extraordinarily
6
high levels at both wholesale and retail levels. Enron Corporation—
a major player in the newly-deregulated wholesale power markets and
a behemoth once respected for its wealth and competence—
7
subsequently went into bankruptcy amid reports of scandal.
In the midst of this environment, and at the urging of the Federal
8
Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission), several utilities
attempted to hedge the escalating prices in the wholesale electric
power spot market by entering into contractual agreements with
9
power sellers. Seeking relief from the rising prices, these utilities
eventually agreed to buy power through long-term contracts at rates
that dwarfed traditional levels, but were still considerably lower than
10
the spot market prices during the crisis.
After the crisis passed and prices approached historical levels, three
western utilities asked the Commission to modify the long-term
11
power contracts they had entered into during the crisis.
The
utilities argued that the prices and terms in their contracts were
unlawful as a result of the crisis conditions in western power markets
3. James Sterngold, Blackout Plans of Little Help in California’s Energy Crisis, N.Y.
TIMES, May 14, 2001, at A1.
4. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 61,353–55 (2000)
(noting that Pacific Gas & Electric Company had to institute rolling blackouts in the
San Francisco area on June 14, 2000, and summarizing a Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission Staff Report concluding that several factors contributed to the energy
crisis, including increased demand due to high temperatures, insufficient generation
resources, flawed regulatory policies, and the exercise of seller market power).
5. California belongs to a larger, regional electricity grid, so the problems in
California extended beyond the borders of that state to others in the region. Pub.
Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1069 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 547 F.3d 1081
(9th Cir. 2008).
6. See, e.g., In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1115 (9th Cir. 2001)
(noting that retail customers of San Diego Gas & Electric company, for example,
experienced rate increases of 200–300 percent); see also id. (explaining that,
depending on whether a particular utility was still subject to a retail rate cap, utilities
either passed the high wholesale rates on to retail customers or else were forced to
assume tremendous debt themselves).
7. See generally Kurt Eichenwald, Audacious Climb to Success Ended in a Dizzying
Plunge, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2002, at A1 (detailing the rise and fall of Enron).
8. See San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., 93 FERC ¶ 61,294, at 61,993 (2000)
(encouraging utilities, in response to the crisis, to enter into contracts of two years or
more).
9. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 471 F.3d at 1068–72 (describing how the sudden
spike in prices in the California spot market, an auction for day-ahead and day-of
trading in wholesale electricity, led the various parties to seek alternative ways to
secure their power needs).
10. See id. (explaining the bidding process that buyers encountered during the
crisis when attempting to secure sufficient power through a long-term agreement).
11. See id. at 1069–72 (detailing the contractual arrangements, the three
appellants, Snohomish, Southern Cal Water, and Nevada Power Companies, asked
the Commission to modify).
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at the time they executed their contracts. Relying on two cases from
the 1950s, which together have formed what courts and other
commentators refer to as the “Mobile-Sierra doctrine,” the Supreme
Court held in Morgan Stanley Capital Group Inc. v. Public Utility District
13
No. 1 that the Commission could relieve utilities of their contractual
purchase obligations only after a finding of “unequivocal public
necessity” or “extraordinary circumstances,” regardless of the type of
14
15
contract at issue or the underlying market conditions. The Court
concluded that the fact that the markets were chaotic when the
parties entered into the agreements did not warrant undermining the
16
“stabilizing force of contracts.”
This Comment will argue that the prevailing characterization of
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine articulated in Morgan Stanley contradicts the
Federal Power Act (FPA) and misinterprets the relevant case law by
creating a separate statutory review process for contract rates. While
contracts play an important role in setting rates in the energy
industry, the Commission possesses a clear statutory responsibility to
protect consumers, and this responsibility requires the flexibility to
adjust contract rates to account for changing conditions in the
markets and among consumers. The intent of this Comment is not
to necessarily argue the merits of the particular contract challenges
involved in Morgan Stanley. Rather, the purpose is to examine the
prevailing interpretation of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as articulated in
Morgan Stanley and how that interpretation departs from the statutory
intent and the case law.
Part I of this Comment will explain the statutory background of
federal power regulation, including the need for, and challenges of,
regulation in this industry. It will then discuss the development of
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and the factual background of Morgan
Stanley. Part II will argue that the Supreme Court erred in Morgan
Stanley because its holding departs from the intent of the FPA. The
12. See, e.g., Nev. Power Co., 99 FERC ¶ 61,047, at 61,185 (2002), order on reh’g,
100 FERC ¶ 61,273, at 61,273 (2002) (seeking relief for certain contracts on the basis
that prices charged based on a Commission-found dysfunctional market are per se
unlawful).
13. 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
14. See id. at 528 (internal citations omitted) (holding that the Commission
cannot modify a contract without meeting this high burden, even when a buyer
challenges a contract rate that allegedly results in unreasonably high rates for
consumers).
15. See id. at 547 (disagreeing with the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the
Commission must determine whether the parties formed the contracts at issue under
a dysfunctional market before applying the presumption of reasonableness required
by the Mobile-Sierra doctrine).
16. Id. at 547–48.
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FPA places no higher burden on the Commission’s authority to
modify contract rates as compared to tariff rates, and the statute’s
stated intent to protect the public interest requires the Commission
to have the ability to modify contracts when necessary to fulfill that
duty. Part III will contend that Morgan Stanley misinterpreted the two
Supreme Court decisions that created the Mobile-Sierra doctrine when
concluding that these cases stood for an affirmation of contract
sanctity. This Comment will conclude by discussing how the unique
characteristics of electricity require regulators to protect the public
interest, an effort that Morgan Stanley hinders.
I.

BACKGROUND

A. History of Federal Regulation of Electricity
Electricity regulation developed according to what some scholars
17
call the “utility consensus.” Under this philosophy, the duplication
of running physical wires across the ground to allow for the
18
competitive supply of energy would be redundant and inefficient.
As a result, policymakers allow for the formation of franchised
monopolies and substitute regulation of these monopolies for direct
19
competition.
Several
industries,
including
rail
and
telecommunications, have operated under similar regulatory
20
schemes.
Electricity service generally involves three stages: production (or
generation) of power; long-distance transmission of power over highvoltage lines; and local distribution of power over low-voltage lines to
21
end-users. In the United States, predominantly private, investor17. See generally Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the
California Energy Crisis, 19 YALE J. ON REG. 471, 476–82 (2002) (explaining the
beginning of public utility regulation and questioning the accepted economic logic
of regulating privately-owned natural monopolies as opposed to having full public
ownership of electric utilities).
18. Id. at 476.
19. Id.; see also David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 765, 767–68 (2008) (noting that, in many parts of the world, stateowned utilities have provided this service, but the United States has predominantly
used a model that allows for publicly regulated, privately-owned utilities instead).
But see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS AND THE ENVIRONMENT 811 (2d ed.
2006) (arguing that, despite the assumption of the industry’s monopoly status, some
competition has been present historically because electricity still competes with
alternate energy sources such as oil and natural gas).
20. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 477 (2002) (discussing how
telecommunications historically have been regulated as monopolistic public
utilities); Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 n.3 (1st Cir. 2000) (explaining
that the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, 24 Stat. 379, provided the model for
electricity regulation and interstate telephone service, among others).
21. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 748.
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owned entities have traditionally had control over particular
geographic service areas and have been vertically integrated, i.e., they
22
have owned or operated all parts of the system. An investor-owned
utility would therefore traditionally produce its own power, transmit
the power over its own transmission and distribution systems, and
23
then sell the power directly to retail customers. Under this model,
regulators determine the proper rates for such service based on the
“cost-of-service,” including both the cost of the company’s investment
24
and a fair return on that investment.
Legislative and regulatory efforts, however, have led the industry to
25
undergo substantial deregulatory reforms in the past few decades.
While both the transmission and local distribution of power possess
the characteristics of a natural monopoly—building duplicate
transmission and local distribution lines to allow for competition
would clearly result in large-scale inefficiencies—the actual
26
production of power does not have the same natural characteristics.
Thus, in recent decades, many independent generators and power
27
marketers have entered the marketplace, and many of the large,
28
vertically-integrated utilities have sold their generation resources.
Such transactions promote competition in the production of

22. Id. at 751. But see id. at 756–59 (noting exceptions to the privately-owned
model, including public power systems, rural electric cooperatives, federal power
systems, power marketers, and independent power producers).
23. Id. at 809.
24. Id. See generally id. at 78–79 (discussing the theory behind cost-of-service
regulation).
25. See, e.g., Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, 16 U.S.C. § 824a-3(a)
(Supp. V 1981) (authorizing the Commission to, among other things, require
utilities to purchase or sell electricity from non-traditional providers of power);
Promoting Wholesale Competition Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory
Transmission Services by Public Utilities; Recovery of Stranded Costs by Public
Utilities and Transmitting Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540–01 (May 10, 1996) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385) (hereinafter Order No. 888) (fostering competitive markets
for wholesale power by requiring transmission owners to offer access to their
transmission facilities on a non-discriminatory basis, thus preventing transmission
owners from offering unduly preferential treatment to themselves and their
affiliates); see also Spence, supra note 19, at 767–76 (describing the transition from
publicly-regulated, vertically-integrated utilities to competition in the production of
power).
26. See Spence, supra note 19, at 772 (describing how economists began to
challenge the long-held view that the entire process of providing power was a natural
monopoly with the realization that the production of power could be separated from
the transmission and distribution functions).
27. Power marketers are market participants that do not own or operate any
physical electric facilities; instead, they simply buy and re-sell power in the various
markets. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 758.
28. Id. at 757. Vertically-integrated utilities own all parts of electric service, from
the generation of the power through the transmission and local distribution to the
ultimate customers.
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wholesale power. Further, the Commission has required investorowned utilities to provide non-discriminatory open access to their
transmission facilities to foster competition in wholesale power
30
markets. In many parts of the country, investor-owned utilities have
voluntarily turned over functional operation of their transmission
31
facilities to independent regional transmission operators. As such,
the era in which nearly all generating resources were owned by
vertically-integrated incumbent utilities controlling all three steps of
the process (generation, transmission, and distribution) is largely
32
over.
B. The Federal Power Act
As technological advances enabled electricity to travel over longer
distances, communities and businesses began to realize that they
could procure power from resources in other states rather than
relying exclusively on resources in their own state, which may have
33
been farther away or more expensive.
Due to the absence of a
34
federal regulatory structure for the increasingly inter-state industry,
and a belief that the Interstate Commerce Act and other anti-trust
statutes would not sufficiently protect consumers from the abuses of
35
36
monopolists, Congress enacted Part II of the FPA in 1935. The
29. See id. at 773 (describing how federal policies encouraging unbundling of
wholesale power led many traditional utilities to sell or “spin off” their generating
resources).
30. See Order No. 888, 61 Fed. Reg. at 21,540 (summarizing the Commission’s
goal in the Final Rule as removing impediments to competition in wholesale power
markets by requiring all transmission owners to file with the Commission an “Open
Access Transmission Tariff,” which sets forth terms and conditions for nondiscriminatory transmission service).
31. See id. at 21,593–94 (encouraging, though not requiring, the formation of
independent system operators as a means of achieving the Final Rule’s goal of having
open, non-discriminatory access to transmission facilities).
32. See Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal
Energy Law, 61 ADMIN. L. REV. 611, 616–17 (2009) (noting that, while verticallyintegrated utilities owned 97 percent of generation in 1978, independent power
producers have accounted for the majority of new resources since then).
33. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 743.
34. See id. at 747 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s determination that the
Constitution limits states’ ability to regulate interstate sales of electricity contributed
to the creation of a federal entity to regulate the sale for resale of electric energy in
interstate commerce); see also Pub. Utils. Comm’n of R.I. v. Attleboro Steam and
Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89–90 (1927) (holding that regulation of rates charged for
interstate service places a direct burden upon interstate commerce and therefore the
Commerce Clause restrains the ability of states to regulate such business).
35. See Duane, supra note 17, at 477 (noting that the need to instantaneously
produce power combined with the interconnectedness of the power grid allows for
significant opportunity for the exercise of market power, including the ability to
cause (or threaten to cause) blackouts by withholding power in times of shortage).
36. 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006). While the Court’s decision in Mobile involved the
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37

FPA authorizes the Commission to regulate the transmission of
electric energy in interstate commerce as well as the sale of such
38
energy at the wholesale level by public utilities. In enacting this
statute, Congress declared that the public interest is affected by the
business of interstate transmission and the wholesale sale of energy,
39
giving rise to the need for federal regulation. The statute requires
the Commission to ensure that all rates within its jurisdiction are “just
40
and reasonable” and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.
The “just and reasonable” statutory phrase did not originate in the
FPA; statutes governing the regulation of public utilities and common
41
carriers in a variety of industries have often used the same language.
While the text of the FPA provides little guidance on how to apply
42
this broad standard,
the Constitution does impose some
43
limitations. For example, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
44
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution as barring
45
“confiscatory rates” in the public utilities context.
Under this
natural gas industry and the NGA, Morgan Stanley involved electricity contracts, and
thus the Mobile-Sierra doctrine will be discussed herein as such. Moreover, courts
generally cite decisions interpreting the relevant provisions of the FPA and the NGA
interchangeably because, in most respects, they are substantially identical. Ark. La.
Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 n.7 (1981).
37. The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 (FWPA) created the Federal Power
Commission to oversee the construction of hydroelectric dams. 16 U.S.C. § 792
(1925 & Supp. VII 1933). The 1935 statute combined with the FWPA to create a new
statute, called the Federal Power Act. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 747 n.1.
Congress later changed the name of the Federal Power Commission to the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. Id.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 824(a). The term “wholesale” means the sale of electric energy
for resale. Id. § 824(d). States, not the federal government, regulate retail rates, or
the rates charged directly to the public. Id. § 824(b)(1). In this way, then, the FPA
protects consumers indirectly: the FPA seeks to ensure that purchasers of wholesale
power purchase power at just and reasonable rates so that when those purchasers
pass on their costs to retail customers, the costs are not excessive.
39. Id. § 824(a).
40. Id. § 824a-3(b)(1)–(2).
41. See, e.g., Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1934) (“All
charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with
[interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio], shall be just and reasonable .
. . .”); see also Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 477 (2002) (referring to
the “just and reasonable” standard as a “familiar mandate” in the context of public
utility regulation).
42. See Patrick J. McCormick III & Sean B. Cunningham, The Requirements of the
“Just and Reasonable Standard”: Legal Bases for Reform of Electric Transmission Rates, 21
ENERGY L.J. 389, 410 (2000) (stating that neither the statute nor its legislative history
provide much explanation of how to apply this standard).
43. See generally id. at 397–410 (discussing the Constitution’s implications on the
just and reasonable standard).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments address property interests with respect to the federal
government and state governments, respectively.
45. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923) (holding that the validity of the West Virginia Public Service
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reasoning, a rate low enough to be labeled “confiscatory,” i.e., a rate
that would prevent the utility from staying in business, would violate
the Constitution’s prohibition on taking private property for public
46
use without just compensation or due process of law. Due to the
complexity of rate regulation, however, statutory reasonableness
requires only that rates fall within a so-called “zone of
47
reasonableness” rather than at a particular point.
This zone is
“bounded at one end by the investor interest against confiscation and
48
at the other by the consumer interest against exorbitant rates.” The
Commission retains broad authority to exercise its discretion in
49
setting rates within this zone.
50
51
Two provisions of the FPA, sections 205 and 206, govern the
Commission’s obligation to regulate rates for the transmission and
52
wholesale sale of electric energy in interstate commerce. Pursuant
53
to section 205, all public utilities must file with the Commission
compilations of their rate schedules setting forth the prices and terms

Commission’s order prescribing rates turned on whether the rates would yield a
sufficient return for rendering service, as failing to do so would deprive the utility of
its property under the Fourteenth Amendment).
46. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public
use, without just compensation.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“[N]or shall any
State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . .
.”).
47. See Mont.-Dakota Utils. Co. v. Nw. Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 251 (1951)
(characterizing statutory reasonableness as an “abstract quality” that allows for a
substantial range between what is unreasonably low and what is unreasonably high);
see also Fed. Power Comm’n v. Conway Corp., 426 U.S. 271, 277–79 (1976) (rejecting
the Commission’s contention that attempting to remedy a discriminatory rate by
lowering it would always result in an unjustly low rate by noting that there is a “zone
of reasonableness” rather than a single reasonable rate).
48. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FERC, 810 F.2d 1168, 1176–77 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (citing Wash. Gas Light Co. v. Baker, 188 F.2d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1950)).
49. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)
(holding that the statute does not bind the Commission to any specific formula for
setting rates and that the effect of the final rate, not the methods employed,
determines the lawfulness).
50. 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006).
51. Id. § 824e.
52. The NGA contains analogous provisions governing the setting of rates for the
sale and transmission of natural gas in interstate commerce. Compare id. § 824d (“All
rates . . . shall be just and reasonable . . . .”), and id. § 824e (“Whenever the
Commission . . . shall find that any rate, . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rate, . . . to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by
order.”), with 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2006) (“All rates . . . shall be just and reasonable . . .
.”), and id. § 717d (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any rate, . . . is
unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall
determine the just and reasonable rate . . . to be thereafter observed and in force,
and shall fix the same by order.”).
53. The FPA defines “public utility” as any entity that “owns or operates facilities
subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . .” Id. § 824e.
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54

These rate schedules typically come in the form of
of service.
“tariffs,” which are essentially offers to serve at the particular rates
55
and terms specified therein. The utility may unilaterally propose
changes to its tariffs under section 205 at any time, provided that it
gives sixty days prior notice to the public before the proposed
56
changes go into effect.
Interested parties may comment on the
proposed changes, and the Commission may investigate whether the
57
proposed rate is just and reasonable. The utility bears the burden of
demonstrating that the proposed rate or charge meets the statutory
just and reasonable standard, but the utility need not show that its
proposed rate is more just and reasonable than other possible rates or
58
that the rate or charge already on file is unjust and unreasonable.
Aside from the express authority under section 205 to reject a
utility’s proposed change to a rate on file if the utility fails to
demonstrate its reasonableness, the Commission has the authority
59
under section 206 to modify an existing rate. As a precondition to
making such a change pursuant to section 206, however, the
Commission first must find, in response to a complaint or upon its
own motion, that the existing rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential and that the proposed rate is just and
60
reasonable. Changing an existing rate under section 206 therefore
requires a different showing than accepting a proposal as just and
reasonable under section 205.
Importantly, in addition to the utility setting rates by unilateral
tariff filing, which sets forth the rates and terms of service available to
any purchaser that wishes to do business with the utility, section 205
61
contemplates a role for privately-negotiated bilateral contracts.
Utilities can therefore negotiate and enter into contractual
agreements for rates and terms of service with individual purchasers,
and, like tariffs, the utility must file such contracts with the
54. Id. § 824d(c).
55. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 531
(2008).
56. See Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 282 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(summarizing the statutory procedure for setting rates).
57. See § 824d(e) (stating that the Commission may hold a hearing to determine
the lawfulness of the rate and may suspend the rate for up to five months).
58. Id.
59. See § 824e(a) (allowing the Commission to determine the “just and
reasonable” rate upon finding that a rate is unreasonable).
60. Id.; see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 64 (1st Cir. 2000) (stating
that the Commission or the complaining customer bears the burden of proof under
section 206 to show that the existing rate is in fact unlawful).
61. See § 824d(c) (“[E]very public utility shall file with the Commission . . . all
rates . . . together with all contracts which in any manner affect or relate to such rates
. . . .”).
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62

Commission. In this respect, the FPA differs notably from other
63
Indeed, courts have generally
federal rate-regulation statutes.
disfavored rates set by contract because such rates often lead to
64
treating similarly-situated customers differently.
When Congress
included in the FPA the allowance for contract rates, it implicitly
acknowledged that negotiated contracts could serve as a useful means
of allocating risk in the sale for resale and transmission of electric
energy in interstate commerce, in contrast to rates for other utilities
65
or common carriers. Nevertheless, the FPA on its face does not
distinguish between contract and tariff rates with respect to the
requirement that all rates must be just and reasonable and not
66
unduly discriminatory or preferential.
As the power markets have become more competition-oriented and
less regulated, market-based rates have emerged as an alternative to
67
traditional cost-of-service regulation.
With market-based rates,
rather than setting rate schedules based on the cost of providing
service, a seller can file a tariff that essentially states that the seller will
68
enter into freely-negotiated contracts with purchasers.
This
procedure largely eliminates the need to file individual contracts with
69
the Commission for review and approval before they go into effect.
Before receiving market-based rate authority, however, the utility
62. Id.
63. See Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 478 (2002) (noting that the
traditional regulatory scheme for rates at the federal level called for a purely tariffbased system in which the utility filed the rate schedule, parties had the right to
comment, and then the regulatory authority accepted the rate if it was just and
reasonable).
64. See Boston Edison, 233 F.3d at 64 (describing how the individualized nature of
contracts, as opposed to one-size-fits-all tariffs, inevitably results in different rates for
similar service, a result that, by definition, is discriminatory); cf. Interstate Commerce
Act, 49 U.S.C. § 10741(2) (2000) (prohibiting a rail carrier from charging a
compensation for its service different than it would charge another person for
performing a “like and contemporaneous service”).
65. See Boston Edison, 233 F.3d at 64–65 (differentiating electric utilities from
other utilities by noting that electric utilities tend to be large companies for which
negotiated contracts form a useful means of allocating risk). The NGA, 15 U.S.C. §
717, similarly allows for rates set by contract. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile
Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 338–39 (1956) (explaining that the sheer number of
railroad transactions required compliance with a single schedule of rates applicable
to all, while a much smaller number of wholesale transactions regulated by the
Natural Gas Act allowed for individualized arrangements between producers and
distributors).
66. § 824d(a).
67. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
535–37 (2008) (describing how technological change led the Commission to permit
sellers of wholesale power to operate pursuant to market-based tariffs).
68. Id. at 537.
69. See id. (noting that the Commission does not subject rates entered into under
market-based tariffs to the requirement of immediate filing).
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70

must demonstrate a lack of market power in generation and
transmission (or sufficient mitigation thereof), and the utility must
thereafter file quarterly reports with the Commission containing
71
Commission-specified contract information.
Courts have upheld
the market-based rate regulatory option, holding that it does not
conflict with the FPA’s requirement that the Commission ensure the
72
lawfulness of all rates. Despite this change in how many utilities set
rates, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine remains equally as applicable in the
73
market-based rate context.
C. Origin of the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine
The Supreme Court issued two opinions in 1956 during the era of
traditional cost-of-service regulation, which created what the courts
74
and the Commission have come to call the Mobile-Sierra doctrine.
With the FPA and the Natural Gas Act (NGA), the analogous statute
governing the Commission’s regulation of the natural gas industry,
allowing private contractual arrangements to play a role in ratesetting, these twin decisions grappled with the inherent conflict
between maintaining the integrity of private contractual agreements
75
and the need to regulate a public good. Over the years, courts have
come to interpret these two cases as erring on the side of contract
stability and constraining the Commission’s regulatory authority to
modify contracts when such contracts are the product of arm’slength, bilateral negotiations between sophisticated parties of equal
76
bargaining power. According to this interpretation of the doctrine,
70. Possessing “market power” means that an entity has the ability to set prices
above a competitive level. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 155.
71. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).
72. See id. at 1011–13 (holding on appeal that the preliminary demonstration of
a lack of market power combined with the Commission’s reporting requirements
suffice to comply with the statutory scheme).
73. See David G. Tewksbury & Stephanie S. Lim, Applying the Mobile-Sierra
Doctrine to Market-Based Rate Contracts, 26 ENERGY L.J. 437, 439 (2005) (concluding
that the distinctions between cost-based and market-based contracts are largely
meaningless in the Mobile-Sierra context).
74. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332 (1956);
Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
75. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (explaining that the NGA affords a “reasonable
accommodation” between contract stability and public regulation by limiting the
unilateral modification of contracts while maintaining the Commission’s authority to
oversee contract rates); see also Boston Edison Co. v. FERC, 233 F.3d 60, 65 (1st Cir.
2000) (contending that the Mobile and Sierra decisions attempted to mesh a newlyforming respect for contracts in public utility regulation with the traditional, tariffbased scheme of utility regulation); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 689 (1st
Cir. 1995) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine represents the Court’s attempt to
balance private contractual rights and the Commission’s regulatory authority).
76. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 699
(2010) (defining the Mobile-Sierra doctrine as a presumption that contract rates freely
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rates set by contract, as opposed to by tariff, carry a heavy
presumption of reasonableness, and the Commission has to
overcome a more demanding standard of review to modify any such
77
contract. The reasoning underlying this standard is that the parties
to such a contractual agreement presumably possess equal bargaining
power and can be expected to negotiate a just and reasonable rate
78
between them.
Parties can “contract out” of the Mobile-Sierra
79
doctrine, but it remains the default rule if the contract is silent as to
80
the review standard that will apply.
81
In United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Service Corp., Mobile Gas
Service Corporation (Mobile), a natural gas distributor, entered into
a ten-year deal with a cement company in which Mobile would
furnish gas at 12 cents per thousand cubic feet to the cement
82
company.
To fulfill its obligation to supply gas to the cement
company, Mobile also entered into a ten-year contract with United
Gas Pipe Line Company (United) in which it would purchase gas
83
from United at the equivalent of 10.7 cents per thousand cubic feet.
By contracting to buy gas at a relatively low price and to sell it at a
higher price, Mobile stood to profit from these two arrangements.
Several years before the end of the term of the contract with
Mobile, however, United unilaterally filed rate schedules (tariffs) with
the Commission that would have increased the price Mobile paid for
gas to 14.5 cents per thousand cubic feet, thus modifying the existing
84
contract.
Mobile petitioned the Commission to reject United’s
filing, arguing that United could not unilaterally alter the contract,
but the Commission declined, holding that the new rate became
effective unless the Commission found the new rate to be unlawful,
negotiated between sophisticated parties meet the just and reasonable standard).
77. Id.
78. See Verizon Commc’ns Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 479 (2002) (differentiating
the way the government regulates business-to-business rates from how the
government regulates rates charged by businesses to the public).
79. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div., 358 U.S.
103, 109–13 (1958) (clarifying that a pipeline company could file unilaterally to
increase a contract rate when the contract itself states that the customers would pay
the pipeline’s “going rate” for service); see also Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723
F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (describing a “middle ground” between Memphis Light
and Mobile-Sierra in which parties agree that the utility cannot unilaterally file a rate
to supersede a contract rate but that the Commission can set aside the rate if it
results in an unfair return, not just if it violates the Mobile-Sierra public interest
standard).
80. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 537
(2008).
81. 350 U.S. 332 (1956).
82. Id. at 336.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 336.
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85

which it did not.
The Supreme Court ultimately overturned the Commission’s
finding, holding that the NGA did not replace the law of private
contracts; rather, the Act intended to incorporate the private law of
86
contracts into the regulatory scheme. The Court thus held that a
utility could not violate well-known contract principles by changing a
87
rate contract unilaterally through a tariff filing. Such a holding
promoted the intent of the statute, the Court reasoned, because
although it preserved the integrity of contracts by precluding
unilateral modification by one party to the contract, it still
maintained the Commission’s “paramount authority” to modify rates
88
when necessary in the public interest.
Although the Court did not define the “public interest” in Mobile, it
went on to do so in the companion opinion Federal Power Commission
89
90
v. Sierra Pacific Power Co. Sierra involved similar facts to Mobile. In
Sierra, Sierra Pacific Power Company (Sierra) was an electricity
distributor that had historically purchased most of its power from
91
Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E), a public utility. Seeing
an increase in demand for power after the end of World War II,
92
Sierra began to negotiate with other suppliers. Concerned about
losing its customer, PG&E offered, and Sierra accepted, a fifteen-year
93
purchase agreement for power at a special low rate. The parties
94
About halfway
then filed the contract with the Commission.
through the term of the contract, PG&E unilaterally filed with the
Commission under section 205 of the FPA a tariff that purported to
95
increase its contract rate with Sierra by approximately 28 percent.
As in the Mobile/United proceeding, the Commission initiated a
hearing pursuant to section 205 to determine the new rate’s
96
reasonableness. The Commission ultimately accepted the new rate,
finding that it was not unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or
85. Id. at 336–37.
86. See id. at 338–39 (noting that the NGA evinced no clear intent to abrogate
contract rates and that the express role for contracts in the statute, in contrast to the
Interstate Commerce Act, suggests that Congress indeed contemplated a role for
private contracts in setting rates).
87. Id. at 337.
88. Id. at 344.
89. 350 U.S. 348 (1956).
90. Sierra involved contracts related to the sale of electric power while Mobile
involved the sale of natural gas.
91. Id. at 351.
92. Id. at 351–52.
93. Id. at 352.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
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98

preferential.
On appeal, mirroring its holding in Mobile, the
Supreme Court ultimately held that PG&E’s unilateral filing under
section 205 could not supersede the contract rate simply on a
99
Commission finding that the new rate was just and reasonable.
Either the Commission or the party seeking a rate change would have
to first make a showing that the rate on file was unjust and
100
unreasonable.
The Court in Sierra then went a step further. Although the
Commission found the contract rate unjust and unreasonable in its
order, the Court held that it did so by applying an erroneous
101
standard.
The Commission had found the contract rate
unreasonable solely because it resulted in a less than fair return on
102
PG&E’s net invested capital. The Court concluded that:
[W]hile it may be that the Commission may not normally impose
upon a public utility a rate which would produce less than a fair
return, it does not follow that the public utility may not itself agree
by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or that, if it
103
does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.

The Court continued by noting that, in such circumstances—where
the seller’s contract proves less profitable than desired—the
Commission’s sole concern should be whether the rate is so low as to
104
adversely affect the public interest.
Putting this idea of affecting
the “public interest” into context, a phrase taken directly from the
105
FPA, the Court explained that circumstances affecting the public
interest could include instances when the low rate would impair the
financial ability of the public utility to continue its service, cast upon
106
other consumers an excessive burden, or be unduly discriminatory.
The Court reasoned that, because the Commission’s authority under
97. Id.; see In re Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 13 F.P.C. 200, 203–10 (1954), set aside by
Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 223 F.2d 605 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (finding
that the proposed rate change provided a reasonable return on PG&E’s net
investment and was consistent with the only other rate schedule PG&E had on file
with the Commission).
98. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353 (holding that the Court’s interpretation of the NGA in
Mobile applied to the analogous provisions of the FPA).
99. Id.
100. See id. (noting that the condition precedent to the Commission exercising its
section 206 authority to modify rates is a finding that the existing rate is not just and
reasonable).
101. Id. at 354.
102. Id. at 354–55.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 372.
105. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006) (declaring that the “business of transmitting
and selling electric energy . . . is affected with a public interest . . . .”) (emphasis
added).
106. Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355.
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section 206 to modify rates is premised on its obligation to protect
the public interest, the Commission cannot find a contract unjust or
unreasonable simply because the contract proves unprofitable to the
107
utility.
In the ensuing years after Mobile and Sierra, the Supreme Court had
little to say about the implication of these decisions, leaving the
108
matter largely in the hands of the U.S. Courts of Appeals.
The
courts struggled to interpret this rule, particularly in contexts that
differed from Mobile and Sierra, which both involved a seller asking
the Commission to increase rates set by contracts that were already
109
on file with the Commission.
110
111
The Commission and the U.S. Courts of Appeals soon began
referring to two different standards of review for rates: the ordinary
just and reasonable standard for tariff rates, and a stricter, more
deferential, Mobile-Sierra “public interest standard” for contract
112
rates. The prevailing characterization of Mobile and Sierra therefore
became that those decisions placed significant restrictions on the
Commission’s ability to modify contract rates that did not explicitly
reserve the Commission’s ordinary just and reasonable standard of
113
review. Indeed, some have characterized the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
as erecting a “practically insurmountable” barrier to contract
114
modification.
107. Id.
108. See John E. McCaffrey, Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. v. Public Utility
District No. 1 Revisits the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine: Some Answers, More Questions, 30
ENERGY L.J. 53, 57 (2009) (explaining that the Supreme Court only issued a handful
of opinions discussing the Mobile-Sierra doctrine and provided limited guidance on
how to apply the doctrine in varying contexts).
109. See generally Carmen L. Gentile, The Mobile-Sierra Rule: Its Illustrious Past and
Uncertain Future, 21 ENERGY L.J. 353, 358–63 (2000) (detailing the “middle age[s]” of
the doctrine and explaining that courts have interpreted and applied the rule
differently depending on the particular context of the case).
110. See, e.g., Gulf States Utils. Co. v. S. Co. Servs., Inc., 39 FERC ¶ 63,026, at
65,141 (1987) (stating that two of the parties relied “upon the ‘just and reasonable’
standard, rather than upon the stricter ‘public interest’ standard set forth in the
[Mobile-Sierra] cases . . . .”).
111. See, e.g., Atl. City Elec. Co. v. FERC, 295 F.3d 1, 14 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“The
public interest standard of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is much more restrictive than
the just and reasonable standard . . . .”).
112. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
535 (2008) (noting the Commission’s tendency to refer to two modes of review, one
with the Mobile-Sierra “public interest standard” and the other without this
presumption, i.e. the ordinary just and reasonable standard).
113. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 50 FERC ¶ 61,266, order on remand, 66 FERC ¶
61,332, at 62,085 (1994) (“We recognize, moreover, that the resulting Mobile-Sierra
doctrine consistently has been construed, by the Commission as well as by the courts,
as placing substantial restrictions on the Commission’s authority to modify previously
accepted fixed-rate contracts.”).
114. Papago Tribal Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983). But see Ne.
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D. Morgan Stanley v. Public Utility District No. 1: Revisiting the
Mobile-Sierra Doctrine
In 2008, the Supreme Court issued its much-anticipated decision
115
on the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in Morgan Stanley. In the wake of the
116
western energy crisis of 2000-2001, the Court provided its most
detailed explanation of the breadth and intricacies of the doctrine
117
since the namesake cases in 1956.
In the 1990s, Californians paid more for electricity than customers
118
in neighboring states.
Amid pressure to reduce rates, the state
began to experiment with the idea of adopting “retail competition,”
which, in effect, would allow end-use customers to choose their
electricity supplier rather than having to receive service from the
vertically-integrated incumbent utility—the theory being that
119
competition would drive down retail prices. In 1996, the California
legislature passed Assembly Bill 1890, a major piece of legislation
120
designed to facilitate the transition to retail competition.
Among
other things, this legislation created the California Power
121
Exchange, a non-profit entity responsible for facilitating a dayahead and day-of auction process for the sale and purchase of
122
The California
wholesale power, known as the “spot market.”
Power Exchange was considered a public utility under the FPA and
123
was thus subject to the Commission’s regulatory jurisdiction.
Assembly Bill 1890 also created the California Independent System
Operator, a non-profit entity responsible for operating the
transmission facilities of the investor-owned utilities and
124
administering the “real-time” power market. The new law required
investor-owned utilities to sell off a substantial portion of their
Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 690 (1st Cir. 1995) (rejecting Papago’s
characterization of the public interest standard of review as “practically
insurmountable” in all circumstances and noting that “[i]t all depends on whose ox
is gored and how the public interest is affected”).
115. 554 U.S. 527 (2008).
116. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 540–41
117. See McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 53 (outlining several of the issues related to
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine that the Court clarified in Morgan Stanley).
118. BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at 964.
119. Id. Under a competitive retail competition scheme, the incumbent utility
provider continues to distribute power to retail customers and remains a regulated
natural monopoly, but customers have the opportunity to choose the entity that
actually produces the electricity. See generally id. at 906–12 (providing background on
the goals states seek to achieve by implementing a system of retail competition).
120. Act of Sept. 23, 1996, 1996 Cal. Legis. Serv. 854 (A.B. 1890) (West).
121. Id. § 1(c).
122. In re Cal. Power Exch. Corp., 245 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 2001).
123. Id.
124. Cal. ex rel. Lockyer v. FERC, 383 F.3d 1006, 1009 (9th Cir. 2004).
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generation assets, to sell the output of their remaining resources into
the newly-created spot market, and to purchase most of their power
125
from the spot market.
In the summer of 2000, wholesale power prices spiked
126
dramatically. On June 28, 2000, the spot market’s constrained dayahead price peaked at $1,099 per megawatt/hour, an increase fifteen
times higher than the average cost before the industry
127
restructuring. The Commission issued an order in the fall of 2000
explaining its view that three primary factors caused the spike in
prices:
(1) competitive market forces (i.e., increased power
production costs combined with increased demand due to unusually
128
high temperatures and a scarcity of available generation); (2) an
129
over-reliance on the spot markets; and (3) the possible exercise of
130
market power.
To help address the dysfunctional wholesale markets, the
Commission urged sellers to enter into long-term contracts rather
than relying primarily on volatile spot markets for their energy
131
needs.
After the crisis passed, some of the entities that had
followed the Commission’s advice filed complaints under section 206
132
of the FPA, asking the Commission to lower their contract rates.
Those requests, and the subsequent denials by the Commission,
133
motivated this case.
Morgan Stanley involved petitions for review of Commission orders
denying modification of three separate sets of wholesale power
134
contracts entered into during the California energy crisis. All three
sets of contracts involved rates that were very high by historical
standards, which the petitioners asked the Commission to modify
135
after prices returned closer to normal levels.
After a hearing, the
125. Id. at 1008–09.
126. Id. at 1009.
127. In re Cal., 245 F.3d at 1115 n.2.
128. San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Cal. Power Exch., 93 FERC ¶ 61,121, at 61,354–
55 (2000).
129. Id. ¶ 61,359.
130. Id. ¶ 61,376.
131. See id. ¶ 61,348 (eliminating the requirement that utilities satisfy all of their
energy needs in the spot market and urging that spot market purchases should
merely supplement a utility’s portfolio rather than define it).
132. See Nev. Power Co. v. Enron Power Mktg., Inc., 101 FERC ¶ 63,031, at 65,270
n.2 (2002) (listing the several complainants and respondents whose disputes gave
rise to the Morgan Stanley decision).
133. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 541–
42 (2008).
134. Nev. Power Co., 101 FERC at 65,270, order on partial initial decision, 103 FERC ¶
61,354, at 62,409–10 (2003), order on reh’g, 105 FERC ¶ 61,182, at 61,939 (2003).
135. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 541.
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Administrative Law Judge’s Initial Decision concluded that the MobileSierra “public interest” standard was the applicable standard of review
136
The
and denied the petitioners’ complaints under that standard.
Commission then issued an order on the Initial Decision, finding,
among other things, that applying the three factors articulated in
Sierra, and considering the totality of the circumstances, the
complainants failed to meet the “public interest” standard for
137
modifying the contracts.
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that, to be consistent with the original Mobile and Sierra
decisions, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine applies only where the
Commission has had an initial opportunity to review the contract
138
without any presumption of reasonableness. The Ninth Circuit also
held that a different standard for overcoming the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine’s presumption of reasonableness applies when a purchaser,
139
rather than a seller, challenges the contract.
The Ninth Circuit
thus remanded the case to the Commission so that it could apply the
140
proper standard for reviewing challenges to these contracts.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit’s reasoning
on several important points but nevertheless affirmed its decision on
141
alternative grounds.
The Court held that the Commission must
presume that a rate set out in any freely-negotiated wholesale energy
contract meets the just and reasonable standard of the FPA (unless
the contract specifies otherwise) and that this presumption may be
overcome only if the Commission concludes that the contract
142
seriously harms the public interest.
Indeed, the Supreme Court
held that the FPA intended to reserve the Commission’s power to
136. Nev. Power Co., 101 FERC at 65,277–78.
137. See Order on Partial Initial Decision, 103 FERC at 62,410 (“We find that the
challenged contracts are not contrary to the public interest because the
Complainants have failed to demonstrate that the contracts in question caused
[them] financial distress . . . cast an excessive burden on customers . . . were unduly
discriminatory to the detriment of other customers . . . or that any other factors on
this record demonstrate that the contracts are contrary to the public interest.”).
138. See Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1 v. FERC, 471 F.3d 1053, 1075 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 547 F.3d 1081 (9th Cir. 2008) (“To justify the Mobile-Sierra mode of review,
the regulatory scheme in which the contracts are formed must provide FERC with an
opportunity for initial review of the contracted rate.”).
139. See id. at 1087 (arguing that the Commission relied on the wrong legal
standard when determining the impact of the rates on the public interest because it
applied the factors from a low-rate challenge—which would be used if a seller were
bringing suit—rather than the factors for a high-rate challenge—which would be
used if purchasers of energy were bringing suit, as in the case here).
140. Id. at 1090.
141. Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Utils. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 528
(2008).
142. Id. at 527.
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modify contracts to “extraordinary circumstances” where the public
143
will be “severely harmed.” While acknowledging that the statutory
just and reasonable standard must apply to all rates, the Court
concluded that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires a differing
application of the just and reasonable standard for rates set by
144
contract.
Additionally, the Court held that:
(1) the Mobile-Sierra
presumption of reasonableness applies even when the Commission
145
has not had an initial opportunity to review the contract rate; and
(2) the standard to reform a contract does not differ based on
whether the seller, rather than the buyer, challenges the rate; in
either case, “only when the mutually agreed-upon contract rate
seriously harms the consuming public may the Commission declare it
146
not to be just and reasonable.” Thus, the Supreme Court reversed
the Ninth Circuit’s holdings on these two points, but still affirmed its
147
decision to remand the case to the Commission.
This decision
answered some lingering questions about how the Commission
should apply the Mobile-Sierra doctrine in circumstances differing
148
from those in Mobile and Sierra and held that the Mobile-Sierra public
149
interest standard remains the default rule for all contract rates.

143. Id. at 551.
144. Id. at 535.
145. See id. at 545 (arguing that requiring an initial opportunity for Commission
review before applying any Mobile-Sierra presumption would be contrary to the statute
and would violate the “commonsense notion” in Sierra that parties to a contract can
negotiate a just and reasonable rate between themselves).
146. Id. at 545–46, 548 (“The standard for a buyer’s challenge must be the same,
generally speaking, as the standard for a seller’s challenge . . . .”).
147. Id. at 555.
148. See generally McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 73–74 (discussing the lingering
Mobile-Sierra issues that Morgan Stanley sought to clarify).
149. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534. Prior to Morgan Stanley, courts viewed the
doctrine as evolving to allow great freedom of contract including allowing parties to
specify in a contract that a subsequent rate will replace the contract rate, or
alternatively, to specify that while a subsequent rate cannot supercede a contract rate,
the Commission can review the contract rate to determine whether it generates an
unfair rate of return. Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v. FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 953 (D.C. Cir.
1983).) After Morgan Stanley, however, the Mobile-Sierra presumption clearly remains
the “default rule.” Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 534; see also Standard of Review for
Modifications of Jurisdictional Agreements, 73 Fed. Reg. 79420, 79421 (Dec. 29,
2008) (to be codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (withdrawing a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking which sought to clarify the standard of review for modifications to
contracts that did not specify which standard to use because of Morgan Stanley’s
holding that the Mobile-Sierra presumption remains the default rule).
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II. THE MORGAN STANLEY DECISION CONTRADICTS THE
CONGRESSIONAL INTENT OF THE FPA TO PROTECT CONSUMERS FROM
EXCESSIVE RATES
The Supreme Court erred in Morgan Stanley by holding that the
Mobile-Sierra doctrine requires the Commission to apply, as a default,
a more deferential application of the statutory just and reasonable
150
review for contract rates.
The FPA’s just and reasonable standard
does not distinguish between contract and tariff rates and does not
contemplate imposing barriers to Commission review of certain
151
Commission-jurisdictional rates.
By holding that the Commission may modify a rate set forth in a
152
Mobile-Sierra contract only in extraordinary circumstances,
the
Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley contradicts a plain reading of the
FPA and Congress’s clear intent to protect consumers from excessive
153
rates.
The statute’s mandate to protect the “public interest”
requires the Commission to distinguish between the interests of the
consuming public and the interests of utilities when conducting its
154
just and reasonable review.
Morgan Stanley hinders the
155
Commission’s ability to make this distinction.
150. See id. at 535 (explaining that the just and reasonable standard is the only
standard applicable for reviewing rates under Mobile-Sierra, and that the “public
interest” standard simply refers to the fact that the application of the just and
reasonable standard can be different when applied to contract rates).
151. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d(a), 824d(c), 824e(a) (2006); see Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at
556 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that sections 205 and 206 distinguish between
the rate-setting roles of utilities and the Commission, but not between rates set by
tariffs versus contracts).
152. Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 (holding that the FPA “reserve[s] the
Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those extraordinary circumstances
where the public will be severely harmed”).
153. 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (emphasis added) (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall
find that any rate, charge, or classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly
discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rate . . . and shall fix the same by order.”); id. (stating that federal
regulation of this industry is necessary to protect the public interest); Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974) (emphasis added) (highlighting
that the statute declares unlawful all rates that are not just and reasonable and does
not permit a “little unlawfulness”).
154. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(stating that the Commission has section 206 authority to modify rates for the
purpose of protecting the public interest, not the private interests of utilities); see also
Jeffrey McIntyre Gray, Reconciling Market-Based Rates with the Just and Reasonable
Standard, 26 ENERGY L.J. 423, 427 (2005) (characterizing the FPA as a consumerprotection statute).
155. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (holding that the Commission should
generally not make a distinction between a seller’s challenge and a buyer’s
challenge). Because wholesale transactions often involve two parties that, in their
ordinary course of business, act as both sellers and buyers of power, distinguishing
between a “seller” and a “buyer” in any given transaction may involve an
oversimplification. Id. Nevertheless, the Court appears to reject the idea that the
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First, the statute does not differentiate between the various ways
that regulated entities set rates, i.e., by contract or by tariff, and it
states that any rate deemed unjust and unreasonable is unlawful and
156
must be set aside. In particular, the FPA provides that “all rates and
157
charges . . . shall be just and reasonable” and that the Commission
shall determine the lawful rate “whenever” it finds an existing rate to
158
be unjust and unreasonable. The two FPA provisions governing the
setting of rates for wholesale power, sections 205 and 206, do not
distinguish between contract and tariff rates and do not define or
explain any heightened burden the Commission must overcome
159
depending on how a utility sets the rate. The provisions refer only
in general terms to “rates,” “charges,” and “rate schedules” and do
not separate rates set by contract and those set by tariff into separate
160
subsections of the statute.
Second, the Morgan Stanley Court’s interpretation of the MobileSierra doctrine contradicts Congress’s intent that the FPA protect the
161
public interest, which requires the Commission to distinguish
between the interests of the consuming public and the interests of
162
utilities when conducting its just and reasonable review.
This
limiting of the Commission’s ability to modify excessively high
contract rates infringes on the Commission’s duty to protect the
163
public interest.
For example, this holding may saddle customers
with excessive rates that the Commission would find unlawful under

Commission should consider whether the interest of the contract challenge aligns
with the public interest as opposed to purely private interests. Id.
156. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (treating all “rates” equally under the statute).
157. Id. § 824d(a) (emphasis added).
158. Id. § 824e(a); cf. In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 783–84
(1968) (construing the analogous provisions of the Natural Gas Act as permitting the
Commission, without qualification or exception, to change any rate it finds to
unlawfully “contravene the relevant public interest[]”).
159. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591, 602 (1944) (explaining that the impact of a rate, not any underlying
methods used to determine the rate, matters when the Commission reviews the rate’s
lawfulness).
160. 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e.
161. Id. § 824d(a) (“It is declared that the business of transmitting and selling
electric energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public
interest, and that Federal regulation of . . . the sale of such energy . . . is necessary in
the public interest . . . .”).
162. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(clarifying that the Commission’s section 206 authority exists to protect the public
interest as distinguished from private profit-making interests of utilities).
163. See NRG Power Mktg., LLC v. Maine Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 702
(2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (pointing out that, absent a demonstration that the
contracts in question “seriously harm” the public interest, consumers will end up
paying higher rates than would be otherwise considered reasonable).
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164

ordinary circumstances.
While the statute does not elaborate on what precisely constitutes
the “public interest,” the Court has historically defined it, and the
broader intent of the statute, as keeping rates as low as reasonably
possible consistent with the maintenance of an adequate level of
165
service.
In fact, Congress intended to afford the public a
“complete, permanent and effective bond of protection from
166
excessive rates and charges,” and the Commission cannot ignore
even a “small dent in the consumer’s pocket” when performing its
167
just and reasonable review.
Given the regulated utility model in this country, one that prefers
regulation of natural monopolies over direct public ownership of
168
utilities,
the Commission must balance the interests of both
consumers and investors when performing its just and reasonable
169
To protect the public from excessive rates while also
review.
ensuring that consumers have reliable access to this essential
“product,” the Commission both protects against the monopolist’s
tendency to exploit its economic position while also ensuring, under
its traditional regulatory model, that the regulated entity has the
opportunity to recover its costs and a reasonable return. This
reasonable return is necessary so that the utility can continue
providing its essential service and so that it can invest in needed
170
infrastructure. Thus, the Commission uses its discretion to balance
investor interest in maintaining financial integrity and access to
164. Id. at 704 (emphasis in original) (explaining that “[i]f a third party wholesale
buyer can show a rate harms the public interest (perhaps because it is too high to be
just and reasonable under normal review), but cannot show it seriously harms the
public, FERC may do nothing about it”).
165. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (construing
the purpose of the analogous Natural Gas Act); see also Pa. Water & Power Co. v. Fed.
Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952) (stating that one of the major purposes of
the FPA is to protect consumers against excessive prices). Keeping rates as low as
reasonably possible does not, however, mean that, in the world of market-based rates,
all higher-than-usual rates will be unlawful. See generally BOSSELMAN, supra note 19, at
155–57 (discussing how the Commission monitors the reasonableness of marketbased rates).
166. See Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. at 388 (describing the Congressional intent of the
analogous NGA).
167. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Texaco Inc., 417 U.S. 380, 399 (1974).
168. See Duane, supra note 17, at 476–77 (introducing the concept of “utility
consensus” and discussing how it shaped American regulation of energy).
169. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 603 (1944)
(explaining that a regulated business’s return should be commensurate with returns
on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks and should allow the
business to retain its credit and attract capital, but may not produce net revenue).
170. See id. (noting the importance of the utility’s ability to make enough revenue
not just to cover operating expenses but also to cover the capital costs of the business
such as servicing its debt and paying dividends on stock).
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capital markets with the consumer interest in not paying exploitative
171
rates.
But while the Commission considers the interests of investors when
evaluating the reasonableness of rates, it must do so for the ultimate
172
purpose of benefitting the public interest.
The Commission
considers the investors’ interests to ensure that the public will
173
continue to have access to an affordable and reliable power supply.
Consequently, when the Commission seeks to determine whether a
particular rate is just and reasonable—regardless of whether that rate
was set by contract or by tariff—the statute requires the Commission
to base its determination primarily on how the rate affects the public
174
interest, not on how it affects the profits of a utility company. The
deregulatory efforts of the last few decades have not changed this
175
statutory obligation.
Despite acknowledging that high-rate challenges and low-rate
176
challenges may often affect the public interest differently, Morgan
177
Stanley appears to nevertheless largely dispose of this distinction. In
171. See Bluefield Waterworks & Improvement Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S.
679, 690 (1923) (holding that rates that do not yield a sufficient return for a public
utility to continue its service deprive the public utility of its property in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Atl. Ref. Co., 360 U.S. at 388 (holding that
Congress intended in the NGA to provide natural gas to consumers at the lowest
possible reasonable rate and that Congress framed the Act so as to provide
consumers a complete, permanent, and effective bond of protection from excessive
rates and charges). Although the Court addressed the NGA in this case and not the
FPA, the relevant provisions of these two statutes are substantially identical. See Ark.
La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 578 n.7 (1981) (characterizing the Supreme
Court’s decisions as establishing a practice of citing decisions interpreting the
pertinent sections of the two statutes interchangeably).
172. Cf. Bluefield Waterworks, 262 U.S. at 693 (holding that a public utility’s return
should be sufficient to raise the money necessary for the proper discharge of its
public duties).
173. Id.; see also In re Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 769 (1968)
(“Regulation may, consistently with the Constitution, limit stringently the return
recovered on investment, for investors’ interests provide only one of the variables in
the constitutional calculus of reasonableness.”); Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. at 603
(citing Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 590 (1942))
(noting that the statute requires balancing of consumer and investor interests but
that, while the regulation should allow for a return to reflect risk, it does not
guarantee net revenues for the utility).
174. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(holding that the Commission’s authority to change rates is based on its duty to
protect the public interest as distinguished from the interests of utilities).
175. See 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2006) (maintaining the same “public interest”
declaration of policy under the statute as when originally passed into law).
176. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
548 (2008) (agreeing with the Ninth Circuit that the factors applied in Sierra are not
precisely applicable to the high-rate context).
177. See id. at 548–51 (2008) (holding that the Commission’s standard of review
for all contracts rates must be generally the same and that Commission modification
of such rates is only permitted in extraordinary circumstances).
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other words, regardless of whether a contract would ostensibly harm
the public or harm the private entity that freely negotiated the
agreement, the Commission must, according to Morgan Stanley,
presume that all such rates are just and reasonable and cannot make
178
any modifications barring extraordinary circumstances. This result
runs contrary to Congressional intent to ensure that the
Commission’s review fully considers the public interest and that
179
consumers pay no more than the lowest reasonable rate for power.
180
Contrary to assertions by the majority, the fact that Congress
chose to include contracts in the statutory scheme does not suggest
that Congress intended to shield such agreements from the same
181
regulatory review given to other rates. The majority correctly points
out that the FPA differs from other similar regulatory statutes that
relied on purely tariff-based regulatory schemes; this distinction
indicates that Congress intended for contracts to play a role in
182
wholesale power regulation.
But anticipating a role for contracts
does not equate to developing a separate regulatory scheme for
183
contract rates. To the contrary, the fact that section 205 specifically
requires utilities to file all contracts affecting or relating to rates with
184
the Commission, and the fact that section 206 contemplates that
185
the Commission may change any rate it finds unlawful, suggest that
Congress intended for all such rates to remain fully subject to the
186
Commission’s traditional just and reasonable review.

178. Id.; see also id. at 530 (opening the opinion by stating that the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine requires the Commission to presume that rates set in freely negotiated
contracts meet the just and reasonable standard).
179. See Atl. Ref. Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 360 U.S. 378, 388 (1959) (describing
the Congressional intent of the NGA as ensuring the “lowest possible reasonable rate
consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public interest.”); Pa.
Water & Power Co. v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 343 U.S. 414, 418 (1952) (stating that
one of the major purposes of the FPA is to protect consumers against excessive
prices).
180. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 531–34 (suggesting that, by deviating from the
Interstate Commerce Act, which called for a purely tariff-based regulatory scheme,
Congress intended for the FPA to limit the Commission’s authority to abrogate
contracts to extraordinary circumstances).
181. See id. at 566 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Congress’s inclusion of
contracts in section 206 of the act implies that Congress concluded that ordinary
contract defenses were insufficient to protect the public interest).
182. See id. at 531 (comparing the FPA to the Interstate Commerce Act).
183. See id. at 559 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]he fact that the FPA tolerates
contracts does not make it subservient to contracts.”).
184. 16 U.S.C. § 824d(c) (2006).
185. Id. § 824e(a).
186. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344
(1956) (suggesting that Congress would not have included contracts in the
regulatory scheme but for the ability of the Commission to modify them when
necessary).
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Furthermore, by imposing its own interpretation of the ambiguous
187
statute on the Commission, the Morgan Stanley Court overreached.
The FPA does not bind the Commission to any rigid formula for
determining just and reasonable rates, and courts lack the authority
188
to set aside any rate within a “zone of reasonableness.” By design,
Congress sought to establish broad objectives and parameters for the
regulation of wholesale power while leaving to the administrative
agency, which possesses expertise on the topic, the discretion to carry
189
out those objectives.
This method of delegating authority to
agencies with specialized expertise is commonplace in our country’s
190
In addition to contradicting the statutory
administrative state.
scheme’s plain language and the Congressional intent behind it, the
Court’s decision in Morgan Stanley misinterpreted the holdings of
Mobile and Sierra.
III. MORGAN STANLEY MISINTERPRETED THE NARROW HOLDINGS OF
MOBILE AND SIERRA AND CREATED SIGNIFICANT HURDLES TO
CONTRACT REFORMATION
Mobile and Sierra, taken together, stand for two relatively simple
propositions: (1) utilities cannot unilaterally modify a contract rate
191
simply by filing a tariff rate; and (2) the Commission cannot find a
contract rate unreasonable, and therefore set it aside, solely because
192
Nothing in these
the rate becomes unprofitable to the utility.
187. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–
44 (1984) (holding that a gap in a statute signifies that Congress has made an
express delegation of authority to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the
statute by regulation); Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974) (“The power of an
administrative agency to administer a congressionally created and funded program
necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap
left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress.”); see also In re Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 776 (1968) (observing that the breadth of an agency’s authority
is determined in part by the purposes for which the agency was created, and thus the
Court has held that the Commission’s broad responsibilities demand a generous
construction of its statutory authority).
188. See Fed Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 585–86
(1942) (describing the upper and lower bounds of the zone in which the
Commission can fix rates).
189. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
557–58 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Congress . . . used the general words ‘just
and reasonable’ because it wanted to give [the Commission], not the courts, wide
latitude in setting policy.”).
190. See generally ANDREW F. POPPER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CONTEMPORARY
APPROACH 1–2 (2d ed. 2010) (explaining that, while the authority to regulate
originates in Congress, agencies are the ones that actually govern).
191. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 337; Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350
U.S. 348, 352–53 (1956).
192. Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344; see Sierra, 350 U.S. at 353–55 (holding that the
Commission erred when it found a contract rate unlawful solely because the rate
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decisions creates an across-the-board presumption of reasonableness
193
The Supreme Court has misinterpreted these
for contract rates.
194
largely pro-consumer decisions as instead protecting the sanctity of
private contracts and as a limiting force on the government’s role in
195
ensuring just and reasonable rates.
By further limiting the
circumstances in which the Commission can modify contracts, the
Court has imposed hurdles to contract modification and protection
196
of consumers.
Because the Court in Mobile and Sierra discussed the Commission’s
review of contract rates and not tariff rates, the fact that courts have
read into these decisions the creation of a separate statutory scheme
197
for reviewing contract rates is perhaps unsurprising. But the Court
in Mobile and Sierra created no such separate scheme, even with
respect to “low” contract rates as compared to tariff rates, and the
Court specifically recognized the Commission’s primary responsibility
regarding protection of the public interest as opposed to the utilities’
198
private interests.
The standard of review for all rates, contract or
tariff, is the same: the Commission must ensure that rates are just
and reasonable, as determined by its obligation to protect the public

produced a rate of return substantially less than average for the company).
193. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (suggesting that, when the interests of a party to
a contract coincide with the interests of the public, that party can successfully
petition the Commission to modify the contract); see also Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC,
55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995) (arguing that the extent to which the Mobile-Sierra
presumption applies depends on the circumstances and on “whose ox is gored”).
194. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 562 n.2 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that these cases should be read as underscoring the difficulty utilities have in showing
that a low rate adversely affects the public interest); Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Sellers of
Long Term Contracts, 103 FERC ¶ 61,345, at 62,446 (2003) (Massey, Comm’r,
dissenting) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra presumption generally arose when sellers
attempted to raise rates and that the higher burden to modification thus had a
consumer protection rationale). But see Gentile, supra note 109, at 362 (suggesting
that protecting contracts was also a key concern).
195. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 (“We think that the FPA intended to
reserve the Commission’s contract-abrogation power for those extraordinary
circumstances where the public will be severely harmed.”).
196. See id. at 548 (eliminating the distinction between a buyer’s challenge and a
seller’s challenge); id. at 545–46 (arguing that Sierra provided a definition of what
“just and reasonable” means in the contract context regardless of when the contract
is reviewed).
197. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 347 (concluding that the NGA gives no power to
companies to unilaterally modify their contract rates); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (“But,
while it may be that the Commission may not normally impose upon a public utility a
rate which would produce less than a fair return, it does not follow that the public
utility may not itself agree by contract to a rate affording less than a fair return or
that, if it does so, it is entitled to be relieved of its improvident bargain.”).
198. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 354–55 (noting that its holding did not preclude natural
gas companies from an avenue of relief when their interests coincided with the
public interest).
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199

The Mobile Court recognized that contracts and tariffs
interest.
possess some inherent differences in how they are set and how they
can be changed, but the Commission’s review of such rates remains
200
the same nonetheless.
A. Mobile and Sierra Distinguished Between How Utilities Modify
Contract and Tariff Rates, Not How the Commission Reviews Such Rates
Contracts play an important role in setting rates for wholesale
201
202
But the
power, as the Court in Morgan Stanley recognized.
references in Mobile and Sierra to preserving the integrity of contracts
referred to limiting the utility’s ability to unilaterally modify its
contracts under section 205, not to limiting the Commission’s
203
modification authority. The Court in Mobile and Sierra did not seek
to create a dual-track statutory scheme for the Commission’s review
of rates depending on whether the company set the rate by contract
204
or tariff.
The Morgan Stanley Court missed this subtle, but
205
important, distinction.
Indeed, courts have arguably misread the
206
holdings in Mobile and Sierra for quite some time.
The Mobile Court simply held that when Congress chose to include
contracts in the statutory scheme, Congress contemplated the use of
207
contracts in the traditional sense.
A fundamental principle of
199. See 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2006) (declaring that regulation is necessary in the
“public interest”); id. § 824d(a) (explaining the just and reasonable standard).
200. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (explaining that setting rates by tariff allows the
company to propose unilaterally to modify the rates it offers to customers, while
contracts require mutual agreement for modification).
201. See id. at 344 (explaining that the industrial use of natural gas frequently
requires substantial investments that the consumer would be unwilling to make
without long-term commitments from the distributor, who in turn needs to make
long-term arrangements with natural gas companies).
202. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
551 (2008) (reasoning that “[t]he Ninth Circuit’s standard would give short shrift to
the important role of contracts in the FPA”).
203. See, e.g., Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344 (“Our conclusion that the Natural Gas Act
does not empower natural gas companies unilaterally to change their contracts fully
promotes the purposes of the Act.”).
204. See, e.g., id. (recognizing that denying natural gas companies the ability to
unilaterally change rates does not change the Commission’s powers to modify them
when the public interest requires it).
205. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 551 n.6 (arguing that, regardless of the
dissent’s reading of the statute, Sierra plainly distinguished between contract and
tariff rates with respect to the Commission’s review).
206. See id. (characterizing lower courts’ reading of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine that
there is a different review process for contract rates as settled for more than fifty
years).
207. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (noting that the rate-making power of natural gas
companies is no different from those they would possess in the absence of the
statute, except where the Act explicitly says otherwise); see also Gentile, supra note
109, at 353 (characterizing the Mobile decision as holding that the NGA did not
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contracts is that one party cannot alter the terms at any time unless
208
Therefore,
the parties mutually agree to allow such modification.
while the statute permits a utility to freely and unilaterally change its
filed tariff provided the modification is just and reasonable, the Court
held that Congress did not intend to allow utilities to have similar
209
freedom to change their contracts. In hindsight, this holding is not
210
very controversial.
In practice, this holding means that utilities will have to take a
different procedural avenue to modify a Mobile-Sierra contract as
211
compared to a tariff. In the electric context, a utility can file a rate
change for its tariff under section 205 and, when doing so, need only
show that the new tariff is just and reasonable; it does not need to
212
show that the existing tariff was unjust and unreasonable. On the
other hand, by virtue of holding that utilities cannot modify a
contract unilaterally under section 205, the utility must instead
present evidence or information to the Commission so that the
Commission may institute a rate investigation on its own motion
under section 206 to determine whether the existing contract rate is
213
unjust and unreasonable. When doing so, the movant would bear
214
the burden of making that showing. The Court’s holding therefore
explained the utility’s means for changing contract rates, but not the
215
Commission’s standard of review.
repeal the law of contracts).
208. See 17 AM. JUR. 2D Contracts § 507 (2004) (“A valid modification of a contract
must satisfy all the criteria essential for a valid original contract, including offer,
acceptance, and consideration. Hence, one party to a contract may not unilaterally
alter its terms.”).
209. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 343 (discussing how contracts and tariffs differed in the
absence of the statute).
210. See Gentile, supra note 109, at 356 (observing that this first holding merely
recognizes that a utility can circumscribe its own ability to file tariff rate increases by
entering into contracts).
211. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that lacking the ability to
unilaterally change a contracted rate does not preclude the natural gas company
from petitioning the Commission to find the rate unjust and unreasonable).
212. Proposed rates and terms under section 205 go into effect automatically after
the requisite period of notice given to the public unless the Commission, upon
protests from third parties or on its own motion, institutes a hearing to determine
the rate’s lawfulness. Upon such a hearing, the utility filing the tariff bears the
burden of demonstrating the new rate’s reasonableness. See 15 U.S.C. § 717c
(detailing the procedure for rates to go into effect in the NGA); 16 U.S.C. § 824d
(detailing the procedure for the FPA).
213. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e (setting forth the procedures for changing an existing
rate); see also Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278, 282–83 (D.C. Cir. 2006)
(describing the interplay between sections 205 and 206 and the required showings
under each section).
214. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (stating that the movant bears the burden of proof to
show that the rate is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential).
215. See Gentile, supra note 109, at 356 (interpreting Mobile as merely recognizing
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The Sierra Court went on to discuss the Commission’s authority
216
under section 206 to allow a utility to modify a contract. The Court
held that the Commission cannot set a contract rate aside as unjust
and unreasonable solely to relieve a utility of its “improvident
217
bargain.” This holding singled out contracts not because the Court
intended to create a new standard of review for contract rates
generally, but because, by virtue of its earlier holding, only contracts
218
require a finding of unlawfulness before they can be replaced.
In
other words, the Commission will not find itself in the position of
having to respond to a section 206 petition or complaint from a
utility arguing that its filed tariff is too low because the utility can
219
increase it under section 205.
In sum, the Court in Mobile and Sierra attempted to grapple with a
statute that seemed to contradict itself: it incorporates contracts into
the statutory scheme, while also appearing to allow utilities a statutory
220
mechanism to unilaterally modify those contracts.
The Court
resolved this conflict by holding that Congress did not intend to
provide a statutory mechanism by which utilities could change their
contracts simply because such a change would be in their private
221
interest. Therefore, the procedure the utility undertakes to change
its contract and tariff rates has to account for the inherently different
222
ways these types of rates are set.

that a natural gas company can circumscribe its own right to file rate increases by
entering into contracts).
216. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 354–55 (1956)
(deciding that the Commission erred when it found an existing contract rate unjust
and unreasonable based solely on how the contract rate affected the utility).
217. Id.
218. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (codifying the utility’s ability to file new rate schedules).
By removing the utility’s ability to replace or modify a contract unilaterally under
section 205, the only available avenue for modifying a contract is by petitioning the
Commission under section 206. See id. § 824e (codifying the Commission’s authority
to modify existing rates).
219. See id. § 824d(e) (stating that when a utility files a new rate, the utility bears
the burden during the hearing of demonstrating the lawfulness of the new rate); id.
§ 824e (stating that, in any hearing to determine the lawfulness of an existing rate,
the complaining party or the Commission bears the burden of demonstrating the
existing rate’s unlawfulness).
220. See, e.g., id. § 824d (allowing utilities to supplement their rate schedules with
contracts and contemplating unilateral replacement of rate schedules without
distinguishing tariffs from contracts).
221. See United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332, 344
(1956) (determining that the NGA preserves the integrity of contracts by barring
natural gas companies from unilaterally modifying contracts rates).
222. See id. at 343–44 (acknowledging that the NGA contemplates natural gas
companies changing their rates from time to time but interpreting the statute as
declining to define these powers and implying that contracts in particular cannot be
changed unilaterally).
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B. Mobile and Sierra Distinguished Between the Public Interest and the
Private Interests of Utilities, Not Between Contracts and Tariffs
Perhaps the biggest error by the Morgan Stanley Court and others
before it is the assumption that the Mobile and Sierra decisions’
223
references to the “public interest” sought to impose a different
standard of review on the Commission for contract rates—a standard
of review more demanding than the statute’s just and reasonable
224
standard.
To the contrary, these references to the public interest
merely reflected the Commission’s already-existing statutory
225
mandate.
The Court attempted to underscore how the
Commission’s duty to protect the public interest requires it to
consider changes to contracts differently depending on whom the
allegedly unreasonable contract harms—not depending on whether
226
the rate was filed as a contract or a tariff.
Rather than limiting the Commission’s contract modification
powers, the Mobile Court in fact suggested that the statute would not
allow natural gas companies or utilities to set rates by contract in the
first place absent the Commission’s ability to review and ostensibly
227
modify such rates to protect the public interest.
The Court also
recognized that those who represent the public interest have a higher
standing to seek modification of their contracts than do those who
228
seek changes solely to protect private interests.
Nevertheless, the
223. See, e.g., Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355
(1956) (“In such circumstances the sole concern of the Commission would seem to
be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the public interest . . . .”).
224. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
534 (2008) (holding that, under the Mobile-Sierra presumption, setting aside a
contract rate requires “unequivocal public necessity”); see also Texaco Inc. v. FERC,
148 F.3d 1091, 1097 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (arguing that the public interest standard
required to modify contracts under Mobile-Sierra is something different from, and
more exacting than, the statute’s reference to the public interest).
225. See 15 U.S.C. § 717(a) (2006) (“[T]he business of transporting and selling
natural gas for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest
and that Federal regulation in matters relating to the transportation of natural gas
and the sale thereof in interstate and foreign commerce is necessary in the public
interest.”); 16 U.S.C. § 824a (“[T]he business of transmitting and selling electric
energy for ultimate distribution to the public is affected with a public interest, and . .
. Federal regulation . . . is necessary in the public interest . . . .”).
226. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (noting that natural gas companies are
“understandably” not given the same standing to complain of their own contracts as
those who represent the public interest, but that they could petition the Commission
to make modifications if their interests align with the public interest); Sierra, 350 U.S.
at 355 (holding that the statute requires the Commission to protect the public
interest as distinguished from the private interests of utilities).
227. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 339 (“[T]he Natural Gas Act permits the relations
between the parties to be established initially by contract, the protection of the
public interest being afforded by supervision of the individual contracts, which to
that end must be filed with the Commission and made public.”).
228. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (excluding natural gas companies from the list of
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Commission can still potentially relieve natural gas companies or
utilities of their contract rates: companies have the statutory right to
petition the Commission to make a finding that an existing contract
229
rate is unjust and unreasonable. As the Court in Mobile cautioned,
though, an entity will only have success when its interests coincide
230
with the public interest. In other words, a natural gas company or
electric utility will only be able to modify a contract rate if the
Commission determines that the rate harms the public interest, not if
231
it only harms the company.
The Sierra Court attempted to elaborate on this idea of how rarely a
seller will be able to successfully argue that a low rate harms the
232
public interest. In Morgan Stanley, however, the Court erroneously
interpreted Sierra as stating that contracts can rarely be modified in
233
As the Sierra Court explained, when a utility asks the
general.
Commission to increase a low contract rate simply because the rate
proves unprofitable for the utility, the Commission’s objective should
234
be to protect the public interest. But, because the public interest is
rarely harmed by a low rate, in such circumstances the low rate would
only harm the public interest in extraordinary circumstances, that is,
if the rate “might impair the financial ability of the public utility to
continue its service, cast upon other consumers an excessive burden,
235
or be unduly discriminatory.” Put more simply, only if the contract
those who can file a complaint but still allowing companies to petition the
Commission to conduct a hearing on its own motion); Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45
(“[N]atural gas companies are understandably not given the same explicit standing
to complain of their own contracts as are those who represent the public interest . . .
.”).
229. See 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a) (“Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had
upon its own motion or upon complaint . . . shall find that any rate, charge, or
classification . . . is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the
Commission shall determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule,
regulation, practice, or contract to be thereafter observed and in force . . . .”); Mobile,
350 U.S. at 344–45 (describing how its holding that tariffs could not supersede
contracts did not completely preclude any opportunity for the natural gas company
to get relief from an unfavorable contract).
230. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that the avenue of relief would only
exist when the company’s interests aligned with the public interest).
231. Id.
232. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(explaining that a low rate could harm the public interest if it forces the utility out of
business, casts upon other consumers an excessive burden, or is unduly
discriminatory).
233. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
551–52 n.6 (2008) (arguing that Sierra plainly distinguished between contract and
tariff rates with respect to the Commission’s review).
234. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 354–55 (“In such circumstances the sole concern of the
Commission would seem to be whether the rate is so low as to adversely affect the
public interest . . . .”).
235. See id. at 355 (defining the public interest in the low-rate context).
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rate will literally force the utility out of business—thus depriving the
public of power—or cause some other serious harm or discrimination
236
to third parties, will a low rate harm the public interest.
Therefore, when read together, the Mobile and Sierra decisions
make no attempt to limit the Commission’s ability to set aside
contract rates as a general matter, as the Court contends in Morgan
237
Stanley. Mobile and Sierra instead: (1) eliminated a utility’s ability to
modify a contract rate unilaterally under section 205 of the FPA
unless the contract permits it to do so; and (2) instructed the
Commission to consider the public interest, not the private interests
of utilities, when evaluating changes to such contract rates under
238
section 206. The Commission must consider the public interest in
all cases; the Court simply sought to clarify how the public interest is
affected differently depending on whether a rate is allegedly too low
239
or too high.
C. Morgan Stanley Expands the Mobile-Sierra Doctrine and Creates
Additional Hurdles to Contract Modification
Courts and commentators have often used the phrase “practically
insurmountable” to describe the barrier the Mobile-Sierra doctrine has
placed on the Commission’s ability to reform freely-negotiated
240
contract rates. This phrase first appeared in an opinion written by
then D.C. Circuit Judge Antonin Scalia, who also authored the
241
majority’s opinion in Morgan Stanley.
The Commission and some
242
courts have since acknowledged the error of this characterization,
236. Id.
237. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 530 (holding that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
requires the Commission to presume that any freely-negotiated contract meets the
just and reasonable standard).
238. See discussion supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing how Mobile and Sierra sought to
distinguish the public interest from the merely private interests of a utility).
239. See Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (limiting its description of how the public interest is
affected to “such circumstances,” i.e., circumstances in which a seller attempts to
raise a low contract rate).
240. E.g., Kan. Cities v. FERC, 723 F.2d 82, 87–88 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding that
the Mobile-Sierra doctrine is “virtually inoperative”); Papago Tribal Util. Auth. v.
FERC, 723 F.2d 950, 954 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (noting that the “Commission itself is
unaware of any case” in which a court granted relief under the Mobile-Sierra
standard); Gentile, supra note 109, at 353 (explaining the struggle for private
litigants that has ensued in the years since the implementation of the Mobile-Sierra
doctrine).
241. See Papago, 723 F.2d at 954 (“The public-interest standard is practically
insurmountable; the Commission itself is unaware of any case granting relief under
it.”).
242. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 55 F.3d 686, 691 (1st Cir. 1995)
[hereinafter Ne. Utils. II] (characterizing the notion of a “practically
insurmountable” barrier as a “gloss” of the case law and holding instead that the
strength of the barrier the Commission must overcome depends on the
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and the Commission has in fact overcome the public interest
243
Nevertheless, Morgan Stanley
standard to modify some contracts.
creates further barriers to contract modification because it appears to
preclude the Commission from making distinctions between highand low-rate challenges and from considering the timing of when the
244
Commission reviews the contract.
Prior to Morgan Stanley, the Mobile-Sierra doctrine had not
245
prohibited contract modification in such broad circumstances. For
example, courts expressed a greater willingness to allow the
Commission to modify contracts that the Commission was reviewing
for the first time as opposed to contracts already approved by the
246
Commission. Mobile and Sierra, after all, involved circumstances in
which sellers attempted to modify contracts that the Commission had
247
already accepted under its traditional just and reasonable review.
Courts also appeared to recognize that Mobile and Sierra involved
challenges to “low” contract rates and that, at the very least, a less
stringent application of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine should apply in
248
circumstances outside of the low-rate context.
circumstances); Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,332, at 62,087 (1994) (stating that
employing a “practically insurmountable” barrier to contract modification on the
Commission’s initial review of contracts would transform public regulation into little
more than rubber-stamping private contracts).
243. See, e.g., Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 693 (affirming Commission modifications to a
wholesale power contract between three entities).
244. See Morgan Stanley, 554 U.S. at 548 (holding that the standard for a buyer’s
challenge must be generally the same as the standard for a seller’s challenge); id. at
546 (characterizing Sierra as setting parameters for the “just and reasonable”
standard for contract rates generally).
245. See Tewksbury, supra note 73, at 445–46 n.81 (synthesizing a pattern for cases
in which the courts have permitted modifications to Mobile-Sierra contracts).
246. Some courts (and the Commission) have held that the Mobile-Sierra doctrine
does not apply at all to the Commission’s initial review of a contract, while others
have opted to impose a less demanding version of the Mobile-Sierra standard upon
initial review of a contract. Compare Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. FERC, 454 F.3d 278,
283 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (stating that the Mobile-Sierra presumption only applies after the
contract is accepted for filing), and Fla. Power & Light Co., 67 FERC ¶ 61,141, at
61,397 (1994) (arguing that effective rate regulation would end if the Commission
had to employ the Mobile-Sierra standard of review even upon its initial review of a
contract) with Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 692 (accepting the Commission’s explanation
that a more “flexible” public interest standard was permissible because the
Commission was presented with the contract for the first time).
247. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC at 62,076 (characterizing the “classic” MobileSierra situation as when a seller attempts to unilaterally increase a contract rate
already on file with the Commission).
248. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 690 (holding that the public interest standard
evolved in the context of a low rate challenge and cannot be interpreted as applying
in all other contexts); see also Ariz. Corp. Comm’n v. FERC, 397 F.3d 952, 953–54
(D.C. Cir. 2005) (approving the Commission’s modification to existing settlement
contracts). But see Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. FERC, 210 F.3d 403, 407 (D.C. Cir.
2000) (extending the stringent Mobile-Sierra protection of contracts to high-rate
challenges).
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249

For example, in Northeast Utilities Service Co. v. FERC, a case that
250
did not involve a “low-rate” challenge, the Commission reviewed a
newly-filed contract and ordered one of the parties to make several
changes to bring the contract within the bounds of the just and
251
reasonable standard.
The United States Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit remanded the case to the Commission, advising that the
Commission had applied the wrong standard and needed to instead
252
apply the stricter Mobile-Sierra “public interest” standard.
On
remand, the Commission had little trouble providing analysis to
demonstrate that the very same contract modifications were necessary
253
in the public interest.
The First Circuit upheld these
254
modifications, recognizing how the different circumstances of
Mobile and Sierra allowed for a more flexible application of the
“public interest” standard and rejecting the notion of any sort of
insurmountable barrier to contract modification in all
255
circumstances.
The Morgan Stanley opinion, however, appears to significantly
curtail the Commission’s ability to adapt its review to circumstances
256
that differ from those in Mobile and Sierra. A contract is a contract,
the Court reasons, and thus the Commission must make no
distinction based on which entity is seeking to change the contract,
and it must make no distinction based on whether the Commission
257
had an initial opportunity to review the contract.
At a minimum,
the Morgan Stanley decision has cast doubt on the Commission’s
249. Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d 686 (1st Cir. 1998).
250. See id. at 690 (noting that the issues in this case involved changing the return
on equity formula and the cost of decommissioning a power plant, neither of which
involved “low rate” challenges in the context of Mobile and Sierra).
251. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 50 FERC ¶ 61,266, at 61,837 (1990) (setting the filed
contract for hearing on the basis that some provisions may not be just and
reasonable).
252. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co. v. FERC, 993 F.2d 937, 961 (1st Cir. 1993) [hereinafter
Ne. Utils. I] (holding that, by modifying a contract under the public interest
standard by finding that the contract was unjust and unreasonable, the Commission
conflated the just and reasonable standard with the public interest standard).
253. See Ne. Utils. Serv. Co., 66 FERC ¶ 61,322, at 62,088 (1994) (concluding that its
original modifications were necessary to protect the interests of nonparties to the
contract).
254. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 693 (affirming the Commission’s finding under the
reasoning that the Commission had given thoughtful consideration to the public
interest in reviewing the contract it had previously modified under the traditional
just and reasonable standard).
255. See id. at 691 (characterizing the notion of a “practically insurmountable”
barrier in all circumstances as a “gloss” of the Court’s holdings in Mobile and Sierra).
256. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (explaining that the Court forbade
the Commission from distinguishing claims based on whether they argued the rate
was too high or too low).
257. Id.
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ability to modify a contract rate that harms the public unless that
258
While the doctrine
harm rises to “extraordinary circumstances.”
has not been “practically insurmountable” in the past, instances of
the Commission overcoming the barrier and successfully modifying
contracts has generally come either outside the low-rate context or
259
upon the Commission’s initial review of the contract, or both.
If
the majority opinion eliminates any notion of a more “flexible”
standard in those circumstances, envisioning when contract
260
modification will stand becomes more difficult.
To remain consistent both with the statute and the cases from
which the Mobile-Sierra doctrine derived its name, the Commission
must have the ability to modify any rate, whether by contract or tariff,
261
when necessary to protect the public interest. And when seeking to
protect the public interest, the Commission needs to distinguish the
262
interests of the consuming public from that of utility companies.
The Commission should not need to show, however, that
“unequivocal public necessity” requires a modification to a contract;
this heightened requirement represents a misreading of Mobile and
263
Sierra and contradicts the statute.
Rather, the Commission should
simply need to show, as with any rate, that the rate is unjust and
unreasonable when evaluated in light of the public interest
264
perspective.
Either the buyer or the seller’s interests could
258. See McCaffrey, supra note 108, at 70, 75 (arguing that the combination of
these two holdings in Morgan Stanley calls into question whether the Commission
could even modify contracts that explicitly contradict Commission regulations or
policies absent a showing of serious harm to the public interest).
259. See Ne. Utils. II, 55 F.3d at 692–93 (accepting Commission modification of a
newly-filed, non-low rate contract); id. at 691–92 (explaining that how “flexible” the
standard should be depends on “whose ox is gored”).
260. Id. at 692; see supra note 258 (suggesting that the threshold placed on the
Commission for contract modification is already quite stringent because it requires
extreme harm to the public interest). Moreover, the Court recently further
expanded the reach of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine by holding that third-party
challengers, not just parties to the contract itself, must also overcome the strict
presumption of reasonableness of the Mobile-Sierra doctrine. NRG Power Mktg.,
L.L.C. v. Me. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 693, 701 (2010).
261. See 16 U.S.C. § 824d (2006) (providing no distinction between contract and
tariff rates when defining the Commission’s duty to ensure that “all” rates are just
and reasonable); United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Mobile Gas Serv. Corp., 350 U.S. 332,
344 (1956) (“[C]ontracts remain fully subject to the paramount power of the
Commission to modify them when necessary in the public interest.”).
262. See Fed. Power Comm’n v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 350 U.S. 348, 355 (1956)
(“That the purpose of the power given the Commission by § 206(a) is the protection
of the public interest, as distinguished from the private interests of the utilities, is
evidenced by the recital in § 201 of the Act that the scheme of regulation imposed ‘is
necessary in the public interest.’”).
263. See 16 U.S.C. §§ 824d, 824e (defining no differing application of the just and
reasonable standard for contract rates).
264. Id.
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265

potentially coincide with the public interest.
Even under the traditional just and reasonable review, the party
seeking to alter a rate under section 206 carries the heavy burden of
demonstrating that the rate violates the just and reasonable
266
standard.
This heavy burden should apply to parties seeking to
modify contract rates as well, but the burden should not be so heavy
as to effectively preclude the Commission from performing its
statutory duty to keep rates just and reasonable in the public
267
interest.
CONCLUSION
Electricity is a rather unique consumer good. We tend not to
appreciate its benefits—indeed, we tend to hardly notice it at all—
until we are suddenly deprived of its use. Our dependence on
electricity makes rolling blackouts and prohibitively expensive rates
dangerous and unacceptable. Thus, while this country has seen the
development of competitive markets for electricity, these markets
differ from markets for other, less essential goods. Even as
policymakers embrace market-based deregulatory reforms, regulatory
authorities still possess a great responsibility to keep the lights on—
and to ultimately protect the interests of consumers.
The western energy crisis of 2001 called into question the ability of
state and federal officials to carry out these duties. Against the
backdrop of rolling blackouts, wholesale buyers of power faced
unprecedented market conditions and had little choice but to enter
into long-term contracts at exorbitantly high rates. Consumers,
therefore, were saddled with these high rates long after the markets
calmed and returned closer to historical levels. This market
uncertainty highlights the fragility of deregulated electricity markets
and underscores the importance of maintaining regulatory checks on
this increasingly deregulated industry.
The majority in Morgan Stanley missed an opportunity to bring the
265. See Mobile, 350 U.S. at 344–45 (explaining that, while unlikely, the seller could
still potentially modify a contract rate if it can demonstrate to the Commission that
its interests align with the public interest); Sierra, 350 U.S. at 355 (giving a specific,
although not exclusive, list of the types of circumstances in which the seller’s
interests would coincide with the public interest, including where the low rate would
force the utility out of business).
266. See 16 U.S.C. § 824e(b) (stating that the burden of proof for any proposed
modification falls on the complaining party or the Commission if the Commission
initiates the proceeding).
267. See Morgan Stanley Capital Grp. Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527,
568–69 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority’s holding as
limiting the Commission’s discretion to protect the public interest).
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Mobile-Sierra doctrine back in line with the statutory scheme and the
cases from which the doctrine took its name. The Mobile and Sierra
cases have been interpreted as shielding Mobile-Sierra contracts from
thorough Commission review for quite some time; certainly Morgan
Stanley was not the first case to hold as much. But Morgan Stanley went
beyond the cases before it. This decision further erodes the
Commission’s ability to protect the public interest by limiting the
Commission’s ability to modify excessively high rates or rates that are
otherwise harmful to third parties. The Mobile-Sierra doctrine will
likely continue to evolve, however, as the Commission and courts
struggle to understand and apply what the D.C. Circuit, perhaps
268
ironically, once referred to as a “refreshingly simple” rule.

268. Richmond Power & Light v. Fed. Power Comm’n, 481 F.2d 490, 493 (D.C.
Cir. 1973).

